Year |
Citation |
Score |
2017 |
Narens L, Skyrms B. Accommodation dynamics for comparing utilities with others Philosophical Studies. 175: 2419-2427. DOI: 10.1007/S11098-017-0966-6 |
0.312 |
|
2015 |
Pacheco JM, Vasconcelos VV, Santos FC, Skyrms B. Co-evolutionary dynamics of collective action with signaling for a quorum. Plos Computational Biology. 11: e1004101. PMID 25706984 DOI: 10.1371/Journal.Pcbi.1004101 |
0.357 |
|
2015 |
Barrett JA, Skyrms B. Self-assembling Games The British Journal For the Philosophy of Science. 68: 329-353. DOI: 10.1093/Bjps/Axv043 |
0.355 |
|
2014 |
Skyrms B, Avise JC, Ayala FJ. In the light of evolution VIII: Darwinian thinking in the social sciences. Introduction. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 111: 10781-4. PMID 25202765 DOI: 10.1073/Pnas.1411483111 |
0.362 |
|
2014 |
Huttegger S, Skyrms B, Tarrès P, Wagner E. Some dynamics of signaling games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 111: 10873-80. PMID 25024209 DOI: 10.1073/Pnas.1400838111 |
0.765 |
|
2014 |
Huttegger SM, Skyrms B, Zollman KJS. Probe and Adjust in Information Transfer Games Erkenntnis. 79: 835-853. DOI: 10.1007/S10670-013-9467-Y |
0.721 |
|
2013 |
Skyrms B. LEARNING TO SIGNAL WITH PROBE AND ADJUST – CORRIGENDUM Episteme. 10: 333-333. DOI: 10.1017/Epi.2013.24 |
0.354 |
|
2013 |
Huttegger SM, Skyrms B. Strategic Interaction in Humans and Other Animals Biological Theory. 8: 125-126. DOI: 10.1007/S13752-013-0128-9 |
0.729 |
|
2013 |
Skyrms B. Natural Social Contracts Biological Theory. 8: 179-184. DOI: 10.1007/S13752-013-0113-3 |
0.339 |
|
2012 |
Skyrms B. LEARNING TO SIGNAL WITH PROBE AND ADJUST Episteme. 9: 139-150. DOI: 10.1017/Epi.2012.5 |
0.348 |
|
2012 |
McKenzie Alexander J, Skyrms B, Zabell SL. Inventing New Signals Dynamic Games and Applications. 2: 129-145. DOI: 10.1007/S13235-011-0027-2 |
0.415 |
|
2011 |
Santos FC, Pacheco JM, Skyrms B. Co-evolution of pre-play signaling and cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 274: 30-5. PMID 21232542 DOI: 10.1016/J.Jtbi.2011.01.004 |
0.335 |
|
2010 |
Skyrms B, Zollman KJS. Evolutionary considerations in the framing of social norms Politics, Philosophy and Economics. 9: 265-273. DOI: 10.1177/1470594X09339744 |
0.371 |
|
2010 |
Skyrms B, Pemantle R. Learning to Network Levine's Bibliography. 277-287. DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_12 |
0.341 |
|
2009 |
Skyrms B. Evolution of signalling systems with multiple senders and receivers. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences. 364: 771-9. PMID 19073482 DOI: 10.1098/Rstb.2008.0258 |
0.44 |
|
2009 |
Pacheco JM, Santos FC, Souza MO, Skyrms B. Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in N-person stag hunt dilemmas. Proceedings. Biological Sciences / the Royal Society. 276: 315-21. PMID 18812288 DOI: 10.1098/Rspb.2008.1126 |
0.317 |
|
2009 |
Argiento R, Pemantle R, Skyrms B, Volkov S. Learning to signal: Analysis of a micro-level reinforcement model Stochastic Processes and Their Applications. 119: 373-390. DOI: 10.1016/J.Spa.2008.02.014 |
0.388 |
|
2009 |
Huttegger SM, Skyrms B, Smead R, Zollman KJS. Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: Signaling systems vs. partial pooling Synthese. 172: 177-191. DOI: 10.1007/S11229-009-9477-0 |
0.736 |
|
2009 |
Skyrms B. The flow of information in signaling games Philosophical Studies. 147: 155-165. DOI: 10.1007/S11098-009-9452-0 |
0.364 |
|
2008 |
Skyrms B. Trust, risk, and the social contract Synthese. 160: 21-25. DOI: 10.1007/S11229-006-9075-3 |
0.32 |
|
2008 |
Huttegger SM, Skyrms B. Emergence of information transfer by inductive learning Studia Logica. 89: 237-256. DOI: 10.1007/S11225-008-9123-8 |
0.71 |
|
2006 |
Skyrms B. Ken Binmore’s Natural Justice Analyse & Kritik. 28. DOI: 10.1515/Auk-2006-0110 |
0.344 |
|
2005 |
Skyrms B. Dynamics of conformist bias Monist. 88: 260-269. DOI: 10.5840/Monist200588213 |
0.326 |
|
2004 |
Pemantle R, Skyrms B. Network formation by reinforcement learning: The long and medium run Mathematical Social Sciences. 48: 315-327. DOI: 10.1016/J.Mathsocsci.2004.03.007 |
0.313 |
|
2003 |
Vanderschraaf P, Skyrms B. Erkenntnis. 59: 311-347. DOI: 10.1023/A:1026046625024 |
0.713 |
|
2002 |
Skyrms B. Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information Philosophy of Science. 69: 407-428. DOI: 10.1086/342451 |
0.423 |
|
2000 |
Skyrms B, Pemantle R. A dynamic model of social network formation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 97: 9340-6. PMID 10922082 DOI: 10.1073/Pnas.97.16.9340 |
0.356 |
|
2000 |
Skyrms B. Stability and explanatory significance of some simple evolutionary models Philosophy of Science. 67: 94-112. DOI: 10.1086/392763 |
0.316 |
|
2000 |
Skyrms B. Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract Vol. 2, Ken Binmore. MIT Press, 1998, xxiii + 589 pages. Economics and Philosophy. 16: 147-174. DOI: 10.1017/S0266267100240182 |
0.339 |
|
1999 |
Skyrms B, Bell GD, Woodruff P. Theories of counter-factual and subjunctive conditionals in contexts of strategic interaction Research in Economics. 53: 275-291. DOI: 10.1006/Reec.1999.0190 |
0.352 |
|
1998 |
Skyrms B. Subjunctive Conditionals and Revealed Preference Philosophy of Science. 65: 545-574. DOI: 10.1086/392660 |
0.344 |
|
1995 |
Skyrms B, Binmore K. Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume 1: Playing Fair. Economica. 62: 577. DOI: 10.2307/2554679 |
0.326 |
|
1994 |
Skyrms B. Darwin Meets the Logic of Decision: Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory Philosophy of Science. 61: 503-528. DOI: 10.1086/289819 |
0.365 |
|
1993 |
Vanderschraaf P, Skyrms B. Deliberational Correlated Equilibria Philosophical Topics. 21: 191-227. DOI: 10.5840/Philtopics19932115 |
0.68 |
|
1993 |
Skyrms B. A Mistake in Dynamic Coherence Arguments? Philosophy of Science. 60: 320-328. DOI: 10.1086/289735 |
0.341 |
|
1992 |
Skyrms B. Chaos in game dynamics Journal of Logic, Language and Information. 1: 111-130. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00171693 |
0.349 |
|
1990 |
French S, Harper WL, Skyrms B. Causation in Decision, Belief Change and Statistics. Applied Statistics. 39: 133. DOI: 10.2307/2347825 |
0.364 |
|
1989 |
Skyrms B. Correlated equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation Erkenntnis. 31: 347-364. DOI: 10.1007/Bf01236569 |
0.369 |
|
1987 |
Skyrms B. Updating, supposing, and maxent Theory and Decision. 22: 225-246. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00134086 |
0.309 |
|
1965 |
Skyrms B, Sosa E. Necessity, the a priori, and unexpressible statements Philosophical Studies. 16: 65-74. DOI: 10.1007/Bf00423085 |
0.532 |
|
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